

# Wrong, wrong, WRONG! methods of DDoS mitigation

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


*“On the wrong day  
of the wrong week  
I used the wrong method  
with the wrong technique.”*

— Depeche Mode.









# Blocking *known attack sources*

- Also known as:  
*“I’m not expecting Chinese customers,  
why don’t we just deny access to the Chinese IPs?”*



# Redlining

*“...In the United States, **redlining** is the systematic denial of various services to residents of specific neighborhoods or communities, either directly or through the selective raising of prices.”*

— Wikipedia.

# Network Redlining

Why is it a bad idea?

- GeolP databases are unofficial and have no mandatory policy on corrections
- IP addresses get sold and bought
- Some IP networks are being used far from the original RIR
- Anycast

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
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*Some of the above might be better with IPv6.*



# Amplification DDoS?

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- A solution here?  
Use blocklists/Flowspec/RTBH to drop traffic from known reflection *sources*!
- Why is it a bad idea?

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- Decided to parse the source IP addresses of reflectors and populate a blocklist
- 2 hours after, the attacker started enumerating IPv4 0/0 within empty packets' sources (with source UDP port 53)
- Started with most popular ISP access prefixes
- 8 hours later, nothing is working, ~1 bln IPv4 in blocklist

# Lesson 2

- **No** blocklists without remote IP address authentication
- **Especially** in the case of amplification/reflection

# But what if...

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**network redlining on the other side!**

# Sound bytes

- **No** blocklists without remote IP address authentication
- **Avoid** network redlining
- **Stop** breaking the Internet!

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